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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
JAMES CUMMINGS,
Defendant-Appellant.

Case No.

12408

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal by the defendant-appellant, James
Cummings, from a conviction for robbery.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The appellant was convicted pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 76-51-1 (1953) at a jury trial in the District Court
of the Third Judicial District, the Honorable Joseph G.
Jeppson, presiding. The appellant was sentenced to an
indeterminate term in the Utah State Prison as provided
by law for the crime of robbery.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent submits that the judgment of the
district court should be affirmed and that the appellant
should be retained in custody at the Utah State Prison.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The statement of facts set forth in the appellant's
brief is accurate and a further statement will not be made
by the respondent except as necessary in presenting its
argument.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
A CLAIMED VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW IN THE CONDUCT OF A
LINEUP DEPENDS UPON THE TOTALITY
OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE LINEUP IDENTIFICATION.
WHERE THE EYEWITNESS HAD AN INDEPENDENT BASIS FOR MAKING THE
IDENTIFICATION, THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT WAS NOT DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW EVEN THOUGH HE WAS
THE ONLY SUSPECT IN THE LINEUP
WITH SCARS ON HIS ARMS.
The appellant contends that the lineup at which he
was identified was basically unfair and implanted in the
mind of the state's witness that the defendant was the

same pemon as the suspect who entered Red Tull's American Service. To support his allegation that the lineup
procedures were inherently suggestive, the appellant
points to the fact that he was the only individual in the
lineup with scars on his arm. The victim of the crime,
Richard M. Lambert, had stated that the offender had
scars on his right arm.
From the testimony of the identifying witness, Richard M. Lambert, at the hearing on the defendant's motion
to suppress lineup evidence and later at trial it is clear
that Lambert identified the defendant at the lineup prior
to and notice of and apart from the scars on the defendant's arm. Lambert testified that no observation of the
scars on the defendant's arm was made until after a positive identification had been made in his mind. He further
testified that the identification was made on the basis of
vcice identification and general features of the defendant.
(Transcript of hearing 9-10, Transcript of trial 9-10.)
Lambert's identification of the defendant was confident
and unequivocal and did not depend to any degree upon
the allegedly suggestive circumstances of the identification procedure.
The standard for determining the illegality of an
identification elicited during a pretrial confrontation is
set forth in United States v. Wade, 388 U. S. 218 (1967),
and Stovall v. Denno, 388 U. S. 293 (1967). In these cases
the United States Supreme Court observed that a pretrial
confrontation will constitute a ground for reversal of the
conviction where, depending upon the totality of the cir-
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cumstances surrounding the confrontation, it " . . . was
so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable
mistaken identification that [defendant] was denied due
process of law." Stovall, supra, at 302.
The language in both Wade and Stovall indicates
that, in considering the totality of the circumstances surrounding any pretrial identification, the presence of certain other facts in the totality may serve either to justify
an improperly conducted identification or to avoid the
presumption that the defendant has been prejudiced by
the allegedly suggestive confrontation. For example,
where factors external to the confrontation itself tend to
prove that the witness's identification was accurate and
hence not prejudicial to the defendant, courts have upheld the use of identification procedures which arguably
could be regarded as suggestive. See, e.g., United States,
ex rel. Rutherford v. Deegan, 406 F. 2d 217 (2d Cir. 1969);
Cline v. United States, 395 F. 2d 138 (8th Cir. 1968);
Hanks v. United States, 388 F. 2d 171 (10th Cir. 1968).
In the Rutherford case, the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals evaluated the accuracy of an identification resulting from an allegedly suggestive pretrial confrontation. The witness whose cleaning establishment had been
robbed was called to the police station to examine a suspect. At the station house the witness viewed the defendant, a Negro, in a room with several white detectives
by means of a one-way mirror, and immediately identified
him as the criminal. Holding that the identification of
the defendant was probably accurate, regardless of the
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prejudicial nature of the confrontation, Judge Medina
placed great emphasis on the fact that the witness had
for some five minutes closely watched the two men who
had committed the robbery, making a deliberate attempt
to study the face of the man who rifled her pocketbook.
This approach to the totality test adopted by the
Second Circuit has support in two Supreme Court decisions since Stovall. In Simmons v. United States, 390
U. S. 377 (1968), the Court validated a photographic
showup relying, at least in part, upon its belief that there
was little chance that a misidentification had taken place
because the witness had an excellent opportunity to observe the suspects during the robbery. In Biggers v. Tennessee, 390 U. S. 404 (1968), the Court, splitting four-tofour, affirmed per curiam a conviction resting upon a
showup identification. Significantly, Justice Douglas in
his dissent considered factors similar to those weighed by
the courts in both Rutherford and Simmons, although he
reasoned that, on the facts of the case, the accuracy of
the identification was in doubt and, therefore, the confrontation violated due process.
In Thurman v. State, 262 N. E. 2d 635 (Ind. 1970),
the Indiana Supreme Court observed that the resolution
of whether identification procedures are unduly suggestive or conducive to irreparable mistaken identity is best
accomplished by a hearing in the trial court, for it is there
that an exploration of the circumstances surrounding the
confrontation can be accomplished. On this basis, the
court upheld the identification and conviction of a Negro
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defendant who had been the only individual in an all
Negro lineup with an "Afro" haircut where it was shown
that the witnesses had ample opportunity to observe the
defendant during the commission of the crime. Parenthetically it should be noted that each of the witnesses
had earlier told police investigators that the suspect wore
his hair in the "Afro" style.
The facts of the instant case demonstrate that a careful examination of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the identification yields the conclusion that Mr.
Lambert identified the defendant without depending upon
the allegedly suggestive circumstances surrounding the
identification procedure. This is not a case where the
witness's identification of the suspect is based upon a fleeting glance of the suspect as in People v. Caruso, 68 Cal.
2d 183, 436 P. 2d 336 (1968) (cited at page 6 of the appellant's brief). On the contrary, Lambert was the victim
of the crime. He was held at gunpoint by the suspect for
approximately ten to fifteen minutes in an area of excellent lighting, and as the witnesses in Rutherford, Simmons, Biggers, and Thurman, Lambert had ample opportunity to observe the defendant during the commission
of the crime.
The respondent does not seriously contest the appellant's contention that situations may arise in which a suspect is the only individual in a police lineup with distinguishing features or characteristics. Nor does the respondent argue that such features or characteristics may
have some suggestive impact upon the witnesses who are
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present for purposes of identification. For example, in
State v. Ervin, 22 Utah 2d 216, 451 P. 2d 372 (1969), this
Court decried the manipulation of police lineups so as to
be unduly suggestive of identification. However, implicit
in this statement is the Utah Supreme Court's recognition that the element of suggestability cannot be removed
completely from lineup procedures. Indeed, the Court observed that the lineup procedure should not be "so laden
with difficulties nor burdened with super-cautions as to
make [lineups] impractical as a method of identifying
the guilty." 22 Utah 2d at 221.
Two recent decisions by the Utah Supreme Court
further support the respondent's position that even granting that the lineup procedures suggested which individual
the witness would identify, the identification is not tainted
where there exists another basis for the identification. In
State v. Vasquez, 22 Utah 2d 277, 451 P. 2d 786 (1969),
the in-court identification of the defendant was permitted
where the witness had an independent basis for making
the identification even though the defendant had been
denied counsel at the lineup. Similarly, this Court rejected the appellant's argument in State v. Jordan, 26
Utah 2d 240, 487 P. 2d 1281 (1971), holding that any
irregularities in the positive identification of the defendant by eyewitnesses could not have resulted in any substantial prejudice to the defendant and did not deny him
due process where the witnesses had other bases for making the identification.
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The Wade· decision outlined in detail the reasons why
lineups are peculiarly susceptible to prejudicial suggestion
on the part of the police officers and held that the Sixth
Amendment required counsel's presence at such confrontations. The Court reasoned that the presence of counsel
\Vas necessary not only to preserve meaningful crossexarnination at trial, but also to enable counsel to deter the
police from unnecessarily suggesting a suspect's guilt or
to correct any situation in which he detected potential
prejudice to his client.
In the instant case it should be emphasized that
counsel was appointed and was present at all times during the lineup confrontation and made no objection at
any time as to the composition of the lineup. The appellant in his brief emphasizes in great detail the testimony
of Mr. Jay Edmonds regarding alleged events which the
appellant contends made the lineup unfair. (Appellant's
brief at 7-8). However, there was ample testimony contradicting Mr. Edmonds' description of the lineup, thus
presenting an issue of fact to be decided by the jury.
Detective \Varran John Peck, who conducted the lineup,
testified that:
1. There was nothing that set the other participants apart from the suspect. That is to say,
none of the participants was particularly jovial or
amused with the proceedings (T. 18).

2. Nor was there anything about the suspect's demeanor which would suggest that he was
extremely nervous or scared (T. 18).

3. The lineup was a representative lineup,
the physical description of the defendant being
matched as closely as possible (T. 16).
The admissibility of the lineup identification was
ruled upon at a hearing upon the defendant's motion to
suppress lineup evidence and the determination of the
trial court should not be disturbed unless it appears that
the court was clearly in error. State v. Perry, No. 12611
(Utah Jan. 17, 1972).
CONCLUSION
The respondent respectfully submits that the lineup
was representative and conducted in a manner which
would not unduly suggest the identity of the suspect. The
respondent further submits that even granting that the
identification procedure was suggestive, the resulting identification was not tainted since the identifying witness
had an independent basis upon which to form his identification and that such identification was a genuine product of the knowledge and recollection of the witness.
The respondent therefore prays this Honorable Court
to affirm the conviction of the defendant for the crime
of robbery.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
DAVID S. YOUNG
Chief Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent

